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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LOUIE E. SIMS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:

Case No. 900324

:

OPENING BRIEF
OF PETITIONER

v.

:

COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16
(1953 as amended).

This court has appellate jurisdiction in this

case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1953 as
amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for review of administrative action
of the Utah State Tax Commission in affirming the tax and penalty
assessed against petitioner for his failure to comply with Utah
Code Annotated §59-37-101 et. seg. (1953 as amended), the Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Does the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah apply to proceedings involving the illegal
drug stamp tax act before the Utah State Tax Commission?
Did the roadblock stop of petitioner's vehicle, which
resulted

in

the

discovery

of

controlled

substances, violate

petitioner's right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable
searches and seizures as described in Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah.
Did that same roadblock stop violate petitioner's right
to

be

seizures

free

from

warrantless

as described

and

unreasonable

in the Fourth Amendment

searches

and

to the United

States Constitution?
Was the consent to search petitioner's vehicle gained
as a result of the initial illegal roadblock stop.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The rights of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
be violated and no Warrants shall issue,
upon probable cause, supported by Oath
affirmation, and particularly describing
place to be searched, and the persons
things to be seized.

not
but
or
the
or

Utah Code Annotated §41-1-17(a) through (d) (1953 as
amended):
The Commission
, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen,
and others duly authorized by the department
or by law shall have power and it shall be
their duty:
(a) To enforce the provision of this
act and all of the laws regulating the
registration or operation of vehicles or the
use of the highways.
(b) To make arrests upon view and
without warrant to any violation committed in
their presence of any of the provisions of
this act or other law regulating the
operation of vehicles or the use of the
highways.
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable
belief that any vehicle is being operated in
violation of any provision of this act or of
any other law regulating the operation of
vehicles to require the driver thereof to
stop, exhibit his driver's license and submit
to an inspection of such vehicle, the
registration plates and registration card
thereon.
(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type
required to be registered hereunder in any
public garage or repair shop or in any place
where such vehicles are held for sale or
wrecking, for the purpose of locating stolen
vehicles and investigating the title and
registration thereof.
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended):

"The Commission" refers to the State Tax Commission, Utah Code
Annotated §41-1-1(d) (1953 as amended).
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A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-102(2) (1953 as amended):
"Dealer"
means
a person,
who
in
violation
of
Utah
law,
manufactures,
produces, ships, transports, or imports into
Utah or in any manner acquires or possesses
more than 421* grams of marihuana, or seven or
more grams of any controlled substance, or
ten or more dosage unites of any controlled
substance which is not sold by weight.
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-104(2) (1953 as amended):
A dealer may not possess any marihuana
or controlled substance upon which a tax is
imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has
been paid
on
the marihuana
or other
controlled substance as evidenced by a stamp
or other official indicia.
Utah

Code Annotated

§59-19-105(1) and

(6)

amended):
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires,
transports, or imports into this state
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall
permanently affix the official indicia on the
marijuana or controlled substances evidencing
the payment of the tax required under this
chapter. A stamp or other official indicia
may not be used more than once.

(6) (a) The commission shall collect
all taxes imposed under this chapter.
Amounts collected under this chapter,
whether
characterized
as
taxes,
interest,
or
penalties,
shall
be
deposited in the Drug Stamp Tax Fund as
a dedicated credit and shall be applied
and distributed under Section 68-38-9 of
the Budgetary Procedures Act as follows:

(1953 as

(i) forty percent
to the
commission for administrative costs
of recovery; and
(ii) sixty percent to the law
enforcement agency conducting the
controlled substance investigation,
to be used and applied by the
agency in the continued enforcement
of controlled substance laws.
(b) If there is more than one
participating law enforcement agency,
the 60% under Subsection (6)(a)(ii)
shall
be
divided
equitably
and
distributed among the agencies by the
administrative law judge conducting the
hearing to determine taxpayer liability.
The distribution shall be based upon the
extent
of
agency
participation
as
appears from evidence submitted by each
agency relative to actual time and
expense incurred in the investigation.
(c) If no law enforcement agency
is involved in the collection of a
specific amount under this chapter, the
entire amount collected shall be applied
under
Subsection
(6)(a)(i)
to
administrative costs of recovery.
(7) (a) If property in kind obtained
from the taxpayer is of use or benefit
to the commission in the enforcement of
this chapter or is of use or benefit to
the participating law enforcement agency
in
the
continued
enforcement
of
controlled substance laws, either the
commission or the law enforcement agency
may apply to the administrative law
judge for the award of the property. If
the administrative law judge finds the
property is of use or benefit either to
the commission or the law enforcement
agency,the property shall be awarded
accordingly.
(b) Before an award under this
subsection is ordered, the property
shall be appraised by a court appointed
appraiser and the appraised value shall
be credited to the taxpayer.
If the
taxpayer objects to the results of the
court-appointed appraisal, he may obtain
his own appraisal at his own expense
within ten days of the court-appointed
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appraisal.
The
decision
of
the
administrative law judge as to value is
controlling.
(c) The value of any property in
kind awarded to the commission or to the
participating law enforcement agency
shall be counted as a portion of its
percentage share under Subsection (6).
(8) Property of the taxpayer otherwise
subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13
is not affected by this chapter if there is
compliance with Section 58-37-13 regarding
the forfeiture and the proceeds and property
seized and forfeited are accordingly divided
and distributed.
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106 (1953 as amended):
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter
is subject to a penalty of 100% of the tax in
addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19103. The penalty shall be collected as part
of the tax.
(2) In addition to the tax penalty
imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing
marijuana or controlled substances without
affixing the appropriate stamps, labels, or
other indicia is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) An
information,
indictment, or
complaint may be filed upon any criminal
offense under this chapter within six years
after the commission of the offense.
This
subsection supersedes any provisions to the
contrary.
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by
the commission are presumed to be valid and
correct. The burden is on the taxpayer to
show their incorrectness or invalidity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 30, 1988 petitioner was served with a notice
and demand for payment of illegal drug stamp tax and penalty.
(R. 257-258)

The tax related to the seizure of 985 grams of

cocaine and 106 grams of marijuana from petitioner's vehicle on
July

27, 1988.

(R. 258)

Petitioner
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filed a petition for

redetermination

(R.

32)

redetermination.

(R. 41)

and

an

amended

petition

Among the issues raised by petitioner

was the legality of the roadblock search of his vehicle.
43)

for

(R. 42-

After a proceeding before a hearing officer, the Utah State

Tax Commission entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Final Decision.
merits

of

the

(R. 8-12)
issue of

The Commission did not address the

the search

of petitioner's vehicle.

Rather, the Commission found that the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
I,

Section

14

of

the

Utah

Constitution

does

not

apply to

proceedings involving the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act before the
Utah State Tax Commission.

(R. 11-12)

Petitioner was also charged by information with the
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(i)
(1953 as amended).

Prior to trial, a motion to suppress the

evidence was made.

Petitioner alleged that evidence was seized

in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing.

That

(R. 246-254)

Petitioner requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling
as that court had not specifically addressed the issues relating
to the Utah Constitution.
256)

That motion was also denied.

(R. 255-

Petitioner waived his right to trial by jury and the case

was tried to the trial judge based upon stipulated facts.

These

facts included the evidence admitted at the hearing on the motion

to suppress.

Petitioner was convicted as charged.

The appeal of

that judgment and commitment is currently pending before the Utah
Court of Appeals in Case Number 890463 CA.
On

Wednesday,

July

27,

1988,

Utah

Highway

Patrol

Troopers and sheriff deputies from Utah and Juab County conducted
a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab County.

(R. 151, 193)

The

purpose of the roadblock was to detect criminal, motor vehicle
registration, equipment
151, 165, 196)

and driver's license violations.

(R.

The roadblock was located between mile posts 220

and 222 on Interstate 15, about two miles south of Nephi, Utah.
(R. 151, 166)

The roadblock was conducted under the supervision

of Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol.
193)
conduct

Sergeant

Mangelson

had

received

verbal

(R. 192-

permission

to

the roadblock from his immediate superior, Lieutenant

James Utley.

No evidence was introduced by the State to indicate

why that particular time, date or location was selected for the
roadblock.
Notice

that

the

roadblock

would

announced in the Juab County Times News.
to four weeks prior to July 27, 1988.

be

conducted

was

That was published two

(R. 152, 179)

A patrolman

assigned to the roadblock testified that he was unsure if that
particular newspaper was distributed outside of Juab County.
179)

(R.

Interstate 15 is the primary north-south highway in Utah

and is also the primary route of motor vehicle travel from Salt
Lake City to Los Angeles, California.

(R. 179)

There was no

indication that the Juab County Times News would be available to
the majority of the people who would be subject to the roadblock.

Motorists driving on the interstate were given notice
of the roadblock by three signs.

(R. 152, 194, 201-202)

Those

signs were about four feet square, orange in color with black
lettering.

(R. 194)

The first sign was placed within one-half

mile of the roadblock (R. 201) and pictured a silhouette of a
flagman.

(R. 194, 201)

The second sign was about two hundred

yards from the roadblock (R. 201) and read "Prepare to Stop."
(R. 194, 201)

The last sign was right at the roadblock (R. 201)

and read "All Vehicles Must Stop."

(R. 194, 202)

Sergeant

Mangelson testified that all of these signs were similar to signs
used at road construction zones.

(R. 200)

None of the signs

indicated that motorists were to be detained by law enforcement
agents at a roadblock.

(R. 201)

posted at 65 miles per hour.
or around the speed

The speed limit in this area is

(R. 166)

A motorist travelling at

limit would be given less than one-half

minute of notice before being stopped and detained.
After the third sign, cones were set in the roadway
directing the traffic to the right.

(R. 194)

were in position to receive the vehicles.

About ten officers
(R. 194)

Sergeant

Mangelson gave verbal instructions to each of the officers as
they arrived.

(R. 162, 202)

Mangelson testified that he had

never received any written memorandum or policies for conducting
roadblocks

from either the Utah Highway Patrol or the State

Department of Public Safety.

(R. 206-207)

In describing the

only instructions he received, Sergeant Mangelson testified, "I
was told the signs met the regulation."

(R. 207)

Sergeant Mangelson also testified that he instructed
the officers manning the roadblock that they were to look for
driver's license, liquor and drug violations.
told them not to stop any large trucks.
officers

were

to

registrations.
consider
driver

inspect

(R. 203)

(R. 203)

drivers'

He also

Initially, the

licenses

and

vehicle

If the officers noticed anything that they may

to be unusual, they had the discretion to have the
pull

over

so

that

conducted.

(R. 208-209)

roadblock,

testified

further

investigation

could

be

Trooper Carl Howard, who worked at this

that

if

he

noticed

a

problem

while

inspecting the registration and driver's license it was within
his discretion
detained
indicated

or

to determine

allowed

it

was

to

if a motorist

leave.

within

his

(R. 173)
discretion

investigative procedures could be taken.

should be further
The
to

trooper also

determine

(R. 173)

what

Officers had

the discretion to interview the motorists, radio the dispatcher
to run a warrants or stolen vehicle check, or request to search
the vehicle.

(R. 170-175)

At about 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1988, petitioner was
stopped at the roadblock.

(R. 153)

Other than the roadblock,

the troopers had no articulable suspicion or reason to believe
that petitioner was involved in the commission of any crime.
176-177)
requested

Trooper Howard initially contacted the defendant and
to

registration.
driver's

(R.

inspect

petitioner's

(R. 154)

license

and

driver's

license

and

Petitioner produced a Georgia State

vehicle

registration

that

indicated

he

resided in Utah,

(R. 154)

At that time, Trooper Howard detected

an odor of alcohol inside the vehicle and on petitioner's breath.
(R. 154)

Trooper Howard also noticed an open bottle of liquor on

the rear seat.

(R. 154)

The trooper asked petitioner about the

odor of alcohol and petitioner indicated that he had not been
drinking that morning, but had been drinking the previous night.
(R. 155)

Trooper Howard requested that the petitioner and the

passenger, Dorsey Thompson, exit the vehicle.

(R. 156)

complied

then

with

this

request.

The

trooper

They

requested

permission to search the vehicle and petitioner acquiesced.
156)

(R.

Trooper Howard searched the driver's side of the vehicle

and Mangelson searched the passenger side.

(R. 156-157, 196)

During the search of the ashtray located in the rear
passenger side door of the vehicle, Mangelson discovered remnants
of marijuana cigarettes.
instructed

petitioner

petitioner complied.
briefcase

(R. 158, 184, 196)

to open
(R. 158)

the

Trooper Howard then

trunk of

the vehicle and

Numerous items were removed.

and suitcase were opened

and searched.

Relatively

small bags of marijuana were located in those containers.
159,

198)

petitioner
conducted
vehicle.

Trooper
perform
as

Howard

field

Mangelson

had

sobriety
searched

previously
tests.
the

requested

Those

trunk

of

A

(R.
that

tests were
petitioner's

(R. 159, 185-186, 197)
During those tests, petitioner requested that Mangelson

stop searching the vehicle.
stating

(R. 186, 199)

Mangelson responded,

that based on the discovery of the marijuana

in the

ashtray, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
187f 205)

Eventually, Mangelson located a package in the spare

tire compartment of the trunk.
and

The package was in a plastic sack

covered with wrapping paper.

On

"Toyota" was written in large letters.
contain

(R.

approximately

one

kilogram

the outside, the word
The package was found to

of

cocaine.

(R.

197)

Petitioner and Thompson were then arrested and booked into the
Juab County jail.

(R. 162)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The exclusionary rules of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution are applicable to proceedings before the Utah State
Tax

Commission

involving

the

Illegal

Drug

Stamp

Tax.

The

purposes of the exclusionary rule are advanced by applying it to
such proceedings.

This is because the arresting agency stands to

reap substantial material gains if the rule is not applied to
proceedings involving the illegal drug stamp tax.
such proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.

Furthermore,

Consequently, the

deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule outweighs the cost to
society in applying it to Illegal Drug Stamp Tax proceedings.
The stop of petitioner at the Juab County roadblock
violated his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable
searches and seizures as described in Article I, Section 14 of
the

Constitution

authority

to

individualized

of

stop

Utah.

The

petitioner.

suspicion

that

officers
The

had

no

officers

petitioner

had

statutory

lacked

any

committed

any

criminal offense.

The State failed to show that the roadblock

significantly advanced the public interest in law enforcement and
that there were less intrusive means available to advance that
interest.

Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of this

constitutional violation should have been suppressed.
The stop of petitioner at the Juab County roadblock
violated his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable
searches and seizures as described in the Fourth Amendment to the
United

States

Constitution.

The

conducted without authority of law.

roadblock

in

question

was

Furthermore, the procedures

employed by the officers failed to limit the discretion of those
officers

conducting

checkpoint

at

roadblock.

the roadblock.

a known problem

This was not a sobriety

area, but was

a multipurpose

The roadblock stop of petitioner was unreasonable,

thus requiring that the evidence seized be suppressed.
Any consent that was obtained to search petitioner's
vehicle was the result of the exploitation of the roadblock
search.

The purported consent was closely related in the time to

the stop and there were no intervening circumstances between the
stop and any consent.

Consequently, the discovery of evidence

resulting from petitioner's acquiescence to the trooper's request
to search is inadmissible in the tax stamp proceeding.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TAX COMMISSION
COMMITTED ERROR IN
REFUSING TO APPLY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP
TAX ACT.
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The Tax Commission

ruled

that

the Fourth

Amendment

exclusionary rule was inapplicable to proceedings before that
body to contest the tax and penalty assessed as a result of
failing to comply with the illegal drug stamp tax actr Utah Code
Annotated §59-19-101 et. seq. (1953 as amended).

In reaching

that conclusion, the commission purported to employ the balancing
test required in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) and
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

The commission

concluded that there was no showing that the application of the
exclusionary rule in tax commission proceedings would meet the
purposes

of that

application

of

rule.
the

The commission

exclusionary

rule

also noted
to

tax

that the
commission

proceedings may result in findings inconsistent with the
of

the

district

courts

hearing

the

related

criminal

rulings
cases.

Finally, the commission concluded that the societal interest in
deterring police conduct did not outweigh the societal interest
in facilitating the fact finding process.
The relief sought below was to apply the exclusionary
rule only to proceedings involving the illegal drug stamp tax
act.

In not

limiting

its decision

to such proceedings the

commission disregarded the unique penal nature of the tax stamp
proceedings.

The commission also disregarded the statute that

required local law enforcement to share in the receipts of taxes
and penalties assessed under the illegal drug stamp tax act.
In determining

if the Fourth Amendment

exclusionary

rule applies to a particular proceeding, the Supreme Court has

employed a balancing test.
Court held that
actions of

In United States v. Janis, supra, the

the exclusionary rule does not apply to the

state law enforcement officers in a federal IRS civil

proceeding.

In reaching this conclusion, several factors were

balanced:

the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the type of

proceeding

involved, empirical data on the specific deterrent

effect of the rule and the negative effect on the fact finding
process.
In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, the balancing test
from

Janis

was

employed.

The

court

determined

that

the

exclusionary

rule should not be applied to civil deportation

proceedings.

In reaching that conclusion the Court emphasized

the nature of the proceeding and the violation that was involved.
The Court noted that such proceedings were utilized in a high
volume of immigration cases, most of which were handled by a
voluntary return to the country of origin.
simple hearing.

Such cases required a

The I.N.S. arrests were made by officers who

specialized in such violations.

The officers were given specific

departmental policies to follow.

Finally, with respect to the

nature of the proceedings, the Court emphasized that deportation
involved a status offense—being an illegal alien.
of

a

case

on

Fourth

Amendment

grounds

and

A dismissal

release

defendant allowed him to continue to violate the law.
concluded

that application of the exclusionary rule

of

the

The Court
in civil

deportation proceedings would have little or no deterrent effect
on law enforcement

officers.

The Court also found that the
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application of the rule in those proceedings would result in a
substantial cost to society.

Consequently, the Court refused to

employ the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings.
The final case that addressed this issue is One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).

In that

case the Court held that the exclusionary rule does apply to
civil forfeiture proceedings.
of the proceedings.

The Court focussed on the nature

Forfeiture proceedings were characterized as

"quasi-criminal" because the object of the proceeding was to
impose a penalty for the commission of a crime.

The court noted

that it would be anomalous to hold that in a criminal proceeding
the

evidence

would

be

excludable,

but

in

the

forfeiture

proceeding, requiring the determination that the law has been
violated, the evidence would be admissible.
To

determine

whether

the

exclusionary

rule

is

applicable to tax commission proceedings relative to the illegal
drug stamp tax act, an analysis of the act is necessary.
2
requires that dealers
to

any

marijuana

or

The act

purchase and affix the illegal drug stamps
other

controlled

substances

that

are

possessed , or purchased, acquired, transported or imported into
the state.

A failure to comply with the statute will result in

z

"Dealer" is defined, in Utah Code Annotated §59-19-102(2) (1953
as amended).
3

Utah Code Annotated §59-19-104(2) (1953 as amended).

4

Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1) (1953 as amended).
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the imposition of the tax and a 100% penalty.

Furthermore, it

is a felony to violate the act.
The proceedings before the tax commission enforcing the
tax stamp assessments and penalties are indistinguishable from
civil forfeiture proceedings.

In the stamp tax proceedings, the

state must prove that the subject committed a crime.

That would

be either the third degree felony for failing to affix the stamps
to the controlled substances, or a violation of the controlled
substances act.

There is a substantial tax and a 100% penalty

involved.

this

In

$394,106.00.

case,

the

tax

and

penalty

totalled

The maximum fine and assessment for the criminal

conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
7
8
distribute
proceeding

is

$12,500.

This

is distinguishable

from

the

in Janis where the issue to be determined was the

income tax owed on profits of a gambling operation.
these tax stamp proceedings have no similarity

to the civil

deportation proceedings discussed in Lopez-Mendoza.
Mendoza simple proceedings were at issue.

Likewise,

In Lopez-

Those proceedings were

to determine an individual's immigration status.

The proceedings

also afforded an illegal alien the opportunity to voluntarily
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(1) (1953 as amended).
6

Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2) (1953 as amended).

7
A violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-5 (1953 as amended).
Q

The maximum fine is $10,000 and a 25% surcharge may be assessed
on any fine.

return to his country of origin.
proof

that

Here, the proceedings involve

a crime had been committed

and the propriety of

substantial monetary penalties based on that proof.
The next issue is to discuss the deterrent effect that
the exclusionary rule would have in the tax stamp proceedings.
The key to the determination of this issue
Annotated §59-19-105 (1953 as amended).
that

the

investigating

agency

receive

is in Utah Code

That statute requires
sixty

percent

of

the

proceeds of the taxes and penalties collected or sixty percent of
the property seized (based on the value of the property) for its
own use and benefit.

If the exclusionary rule did not apply in

these proceedings, the investigating agency could disregard the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and lose the criminal case
because the evidence seized is ordered suppressed.

However, that

same agency could still receive substantial monetary benefits as
a result of the illegal actions of its agents.
creates

a

agencies
Amendment.

substantial
to

engage

in

financial
practices

incentive
that

Such a procedure
to

violate

investigative
the

Fourth

The statute has the potential of allowing agencies

who investigate narcotics violations to receive financing through
illegal conduct.
Requiring

that

tax

proceeds

be

shared

with

an

investigative agency distinguishes these illegal drug tax stamp
proceedings from other proceedings before the tax commission.
The only other statute that allows the investigating agency to

share in the proceeds of a seizure is the forfeiture statute.
As

previously

noted,

the

forfeiture proceedings.
supra.

exclusionary

rule

does

apply

to

One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,

There is a substantial deterrent effect in applying the

exclusionary rule to the illegal drug stamp tax proceedings:
prevents

investigative

Amendment violations.

agencies

from

profiting

from

it

Fourth

The exclusionary rule does undermine the

fact finding process in these proceedings.

However, what is at

issue is an additional penalty for a violation of the law rather
than a determination of one's income tax or immigration status.
The punitive nature of the tax and penalty
prevent agencies from receiving

and the need to

financial benefits for Fourth

Amendment violations outweigh the negative effect on the fact
finding process.
illegal

drug

The exclusionary rule should be applied to the

stamp

tax

proceedings

before

the

state

tax

commission.
POINT II
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF ROADBLOCKS.
ANY
EVIDENCE SEIZED AT SUCH A STOP MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
This

court

has

expressed

concern

with

the

Fourth

Amendment rulings of the federal courts in vehicle search cases.
As an alternative, counsel has been encouraged to litigate these
issues under Article Ir Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

See:

Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(8)(a) (1953 as amended).

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1986)

u

In Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983), Justice OfConner encouraged state courts to
decide

search

and

seizure

issues

on

state

constitutional

provisions rather than resorting to a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, two judges of this court have held that Article I,
Section

14 of

the Utah

State

Constitution

provides

greater

protections to individuals than does the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990).n
In State v. Earl, supraf this court suggested that the
analysis described in State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985),
be applied to an interpretation of Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

The most appropriate form of analysis to

apply to the roadblock issue is to look to the rulings of other
state courts on similar constitutional provisions.12
This is
because the texts of both Article
Constitution

and

the

Fourth

I, Section 14 of the Utah

Amendment

are

nearly

identical.

However, a number of other states have held that roadblocks are
unreasonable

seizures

of

the person

on

state

constitutional

For an extensive discussion of the background of this issue
see:
Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.U.
J. of Pub. Law 357 (1989).
See footnote 1.
12
This is the analysis employed
State v. Lorocco, supra.

in the plurality opinion in

grounds.

There are three basic reasons given by these courts

for this result:

First, law enforcement agents lack statutory

authority to conduct a roadblock.

Second, an individual cannot

be

that

detained

without

a

showing

the

officer

has

individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed.

an

Third,

a balancing of the interests involved indicates that roadblock
stops are unreasonable seizures of the person.
A.
THE ROADBLOCK IN THIS CASE WAS
WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW.
Several
addressed

the

state

need

for

appellate
statutory

courts

CONDUCTED
have

authority

enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock.

to

specifically
enable

law

The Supreme Court of

Oregon addressed this issue in the context of a civil suit for
damages by a plaintiff who was stopped at a roadblock, Nelson v.
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987).
criminal cases

Two other

involving similar roadblocks were addressed by

that court at that time:

State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743

P.2d 711 (Or. 1987), and State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d
715

(Or. 1987).

In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state

sought to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a
seizure was constitutionally authorized.
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory
authority to conduct a roadblock under a general statute that

See Points II A, B and C, infra.

gave

law

enforcement

criminal law.
authorized
conducted
Manual."

agencies

the

authority

to

enforce

the

The state claimed that the statute implicitly

roadblocks and that the roadblock

in question was

in accordance with "The Oregon State Police Patrol
In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned,
By and large, agencies of the executive
branch are free to carry out their assigned
responsibilities
in ways of their own
choosing.
Making explicit the manner in
which any agency is to accomplish its task
falls to the agency head or that official's
designee to instruct or sub-delegate to
subordinated officials.
However, some procedures may invade the
personal freedoms protected from government
interference by the constitution. Roadblocks
are seizures of the person, possibly to be
followed by a search of the person or the
person's effects.
For this reason, the
authority to conduct roadblocks cannot be
implied.
Before they search or seize,
executive
agencies
must
have
explicit
authority from outside the executive branch.

743 P.2d at 695.
Similarly, in State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756
P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988), the Supreme Court of Idaho held that its
constitutional provision prohibiting warrantless and unreasonable
searches and seizures required express legislative authority to
conduct a roadblock.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

found roadblocks to be unreasonable under similar provisions of
the Oklahoma Constitution.

One of the bases for that court's

decision was that officers lacked statutory authority to make
such stops.

State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984).

In Utah there is no express statutory authority that
allows law enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock.

Before a

vehicle may be stopped to investigate a violation of the motor
vehicle code, the Utah statute specifically requires an officer
to have a reasonable belief that there has been a violation of
the law.14

To conduct a seizure of the person to investigate

for any other criminal violation, the Utah statute mandates that
the officer have at the very least a reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been committed.15
on the interstate.
vehicles

were

using

In this case, vehicles were stopped

The only reason for the stop was that the
that

roadway.

There

is

no

statutory

authority that allows law enforcement agents to employ such a
procedure.

Due to the lack of legal authority, the stop of

appellant's vehicle and resulting search were unreasonable.

The

stop and search in this case violates Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah.
B.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH REQUIRES INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION TO
JUSTIFY A SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PERSON.

x

Utah Code Annotated §41-l-17(c) (1953 as amended).

15

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended).

Davis
and
Wallentine,
A
Model
for
Analyzing
the
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops, supra, also
concludes that there is no legal authority in Utah to conduct
roadblock stops. A roadblock stop, the authors further conclude,
would be unconstitutional.
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In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super.
1985), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed the propriety
of

roadblock stops under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Pennsylvania

legislature

had

previously

enacted

a

The

statute

allowing law enforcement agencies to utilize roadblock stops for
the purpose of checking vehicles, drivers or documents.
defendant

The

in Tarbert had been convicted of driving under the

influence as a result of a roadblock stop.

The court reviewed

the cases upholding the constitutionality of roadblocks.

The

court then noted:
Courts upholding the constitutionality of
roadblocks
are not unmindful of their
intrusivenessf
but
rather,
stress
that
careful control and absence of discretion can
bring the use of the roadblock within the
Fourth Amendment.
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, supra, at 225.

With respect to this

reasoning the court then held:
While
the
arguments
supporting
the
constitutionality of systematic roadblocks
are persuasive, the rationale supporting them
is flawed. No amount of control or limited
discretion can justify the "seizure" that
takes place in the complete absence of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a
motor
vehicle
violation
has
occurred.
Certainly,
the
Constitution
of
our
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right
to be free from intrusions where one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
lb. at 225-226.
Constitution

The court ultimately held that the Pennsylvania

is violated

when

roadblock

stops

are

based

on

neither probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion that a crime
has been committed.

The

holding

in

State

v.

Henderson,

supra,

has

previously been discussed with respect to the effect of the lack
of statutory authority to conduct a roadblock.

The Idaho Supreme

Court went further and held that under the Idaho Constitution,
law enforcement

officers are required

to have

individualized

suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before a stop of a vehicle may
be made.

The Supreme Court of Oregon reached the same conclusion

in State v. Boyanovsky, supra.

That case was the companion case

to Nelson v. Lane County, supra.

It addressed a roadblock search

resulting in a criminal

conviction rather than a civil action

against

authorities.

law

enforcement

The

Supreme

Court of

Louisiana also concluded that there was a need for individualized
suspicion

to

constitution.

invade

one's

privacy

under

that

state's

Consequently, a roadblock stop was held to be

unconstitutional in Louisiana.

State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293

(La. 1988).
By statute, officers

in Utah

are

required

to have

individualized suspicion of criminal activity before violating a
citizen's privacy interest.17
Both the Utah Supreme Court and
the court of appeals have required such individualized suspicion
in addressing Fourth Amendment

issues;

State v. Mendoza, 748

P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988).

The same requirement for individualized suspicion was

found to be applicable to Article I, Section 14, of the Utah
Constitution in State v. Larocco, supra.
17
See discussion in Point I, A., supra.
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In Larocco, the court addressed the issue of whether
the inspection of a vehicle identification number (VIN) violated
the

Fourth

Amendment

Constitution of Utah.

and

Article

I,

Section

14

of

the

The court of appeals held that the opening

of the vehicle door to look at the VIN did not implicate any
Fourth Amendment interests.
Ct. App. 1987).

On

State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah

certiorari, Justice

Durham

opinion that was joined by Justice Zimmerman.

authored an

In that opinion,

Justice Durham found that the VIN inspection violated Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
In Larocco, Justice Durham held that Article I, Section
14 of the Constitution of Utah required the State to show that
there

was

both

probable

cause

and

exigent

justify a warrantless vehicle search.

circumstances

to

The basis of this holding

was a need to simplify the rules regarding warrantless vehicle
stops.

Justice

Amendment

rulings

inconsistent.
the

Courtfs

reasonable

Durham
on

reviewed
such

the

stops

Supreme

and

Court's

found

them

Fourth
to

be

The inconsistencies were noted to be a result of
misapplication

of

the

doctrine

expectation of privacy as

relating

it affected

to the

the warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Durham noted that the expectation of privacy
doctrine was originally employed to determine standing
Fourth

Amendment

was

implicated

in

a

search

or

(if the

seizure).

However, in recent cases the Supreme Court has used the level of
the claimant's expectation of privacy to determine if a warrant

is required.
Fourth

This has resulted in the warrant clause of the

Amendment

improperly

being

read

reasonableness clause of that amendment.

as

part

of

the

In Larocco, Justice

Durham's position was that the question of the privacy interest
is a threshold issue to determine if Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution is implicated.
Justice Durham then found that Article I, Section 14
contains two separate requirements and both must be satisfied to
find a warrantless search valid.

There must be a showing that

the search was reasonable (based on probable cause).

There must

also be a showing that a warrant was obtained or there were
exigent circumstances that prevented the officers from obtaining
a warrant.

With respect to exigent circumstances, Justice Durham

stated ". . .warrantless searches will be permitted only where
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect
the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction
of evidence."

794 P.2d at 469-470.

In Larocco, Justice Durham found that the officers had
probable cause to believe the vehicle in question was stolen.
However,

there were no exigent

circumstances

to justify the

warrantless opening of the vehicle door to check the VIN.

With

roadblocks, there is neither a warrant, exigent circumstances,
nor individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed.

See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), and California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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Consequently, a roadblock stop fails to meet both requirements of
Justice Durham's Larocco standard.

On this basis, the roadblock

stop violates Article If Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
This conclusion is reinforced when the rationale used
to justify a roadblock is considered.
Public Safety v. Sitz,

U.S.

In Michigan Department of

, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), a

balancing test was employed to determine if a sobriety roadblock
violated the Fourth Amendment.

The State's interest is balanced

against the effectiveness of the action taken to achieve that
interest and the intrusion to an individual's privacy.
reasoning

was

expressly

rejected

in

Larocco

requirements of the warrant clause must be met.

because

This
the

Furthermore,

Sitz would involve a misapplication of the analysis of privacy
interests as interpreted in Article I, Section 14.
In this case Trooper Howard testified that the only
reason for the stop of petitioner's vehicle was the roadblock.
The trooper candidly admitted that there was no probable cause to
believe that petitioner was engaged in any criminal conduct prior
to the stop.
not

articulate

petitioner was
stop.

Likewise, the trooper also admitted that he could
any

facts

involved

or

circumstances

to

indicate

that

in any criminal conduct prior to the

For this reason, the stop of petitioner's vehicle violated

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
C.
A BALANCING OF INTERESTS RESULTS IN THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE ROADBLOCK STOP IN THIS
CASE WAS UNREASONABLE.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE

STOP VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
In determining the reasonableness of police action in
relation to an interference with a privacy interest courts may
apply a balancing test.
1985).

State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H.

In that case the propriety of a roadblock to investigate

drunk driving under the New Hampshire Constitution was addressed.
The court required that the following test be met:
To justify the search or seizure of a motor
vehicle, absent probable cause or even a
reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense
is being committed, the State must prove that
its conduct significantly advances the public
interest in a manner that outweighs the
accompanying intrusion on individual rights.
It must further prove that no less intrusive
means are available to accomplish the State's
goals.
499 A.2d at 981.
In applying that test, the court held that a roadblock
is

not

an

driving.

effective

means

of

detecting

or

deterring

drunk

The court described the significant number of vehicles

stopped, the number of officers deployed at the roadblock and the
very few arrests that were actually made.

The court concluded

that the public interest in deterring drunk driving offenses was
not

significantly

roadblock.

outweighed

by

the

intrusions

caused

by a

This is because the court found from the statistics

introduced at trial that highly visible roving patrols made more
arrests

than

were

effected

at

the

roadblock.

The patrols

involved about the same number of officers as were deployed at
the

roadblock.

Consequently,

such

patrols

intrusive means to accomplish the State's goals.
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provided

a less

The Supreme Court of Idaho reached the same conclusion
in

State

v.

Henderson,

supra.

In

that

case

the

evidence

indicated that officers on patrol would make more arrests than
that number of officers deployed at a roadblock.

The court

concluded:
Thus, the testimony of the two police
officials most responsible for the roadblock
show unequivocally that these warrantless
searches conducted without any suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing are less efficient than
the normal stops based on probable cause.
Therefore, roadblocks are an inefficient and
unnecessary constraint on a person's right to
remain free of search or seizure absent
probable cause.
[emphasis in the original] 756 P.2d at 1061.
In this case, there was no evidence introduced that
would demonstrate the effectiveness of a roadblock as opposed to
other

less

conclusion

intrusive
that

can

means
be

of

reached

investigation.
from

the

case

However,
law

is that

roadblocks are not an effective means of law enforcement.
roadblock is not an efficient use of police manpower.

the

The

Likewise,

a roadblock creates a highly intrusive and inconvenient situation
19
for the travelling public.
For these reasons, a roadblock
does not pass the balancing test employed by other state courts
to determine
iy

the

reasonableness of

a stop

that

is based on

See also, State v. Barcia, 549 A.2d 491 (N.J. Super. 1988)
where a roadblock on the New Jersey side of the George Washington
bridge caused a traffic jam in New York City involving over one
million of motor vehicles, and taking over four hours to unravel.
The Court described the situation as a "traffic morass of
monumental proportions." 549 A.2d 497.

neither

probable

activity.

cause

nor

reasonable

suspicion

of

criminal

The State failed to produce any evidence tending to

show how effective this particular roadblock was.

The state

cannot meet the requirements of the balancing test employed in
Henderson and Koppel.

The only conclusion that can be reached is

that the roadblock stop of appellant was unreasonable and thus
violated Article Ir Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
D.
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED IS THE PROPER
REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In State v. Larocco, supra. Justice Durham held in her
plurality opinion that there are some eighteen states that have
found that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of their
respective state search and seizure provisions.20
Based on the
actions of these courts and the application of the exclusionary
rule

to

Fourth

Amendment

violations,

Justices

Durham

and

Zimmerman held that violations of Article I, Section 14 require
application of the exclusionary rule.

With respect to illegal

drug tax stamp proceedings, a balancing of the interests requires
the application of the exclusionary rule. 21
The evidence that was seized in the stop at issue in
this case, one kilogram of cocaine, was the only evidence that
established the tax and penalty assessed by the tax commission.
20
See State v. Larocco, supra, at 472 fn. 3.
21
See Point I, supra.
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The officers1 violation of petitioner's right to be free from
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described
in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah requires
suppression of the cocaine which was seized.

This would require

that the petitioner's liability for the tax and penalty resulting
from

the

violation

of

the

illegal

drug

stamp

tax

act

be

discharged,
POINT III
A ROADBLOCK FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF CRIME
DETECTION VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, supra,
the Supreme Court held that the use of a sobriety checkpoint or
roadblock to curb the problem of drunk driving on the highways
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
roadblocks

do

not

violate

the

In determining that such

Fourth

Amendment,

the

Court

employed the balancing test described in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47

(1979).

Brown

requires

courts

to

balance

the

state's

interests against both the effectiveness of the state's action in
achieving that interest and the intrusion on the individual's
privacy.
In
checkpoint

applying

this

balancing

test

to

the

in Sitz, the Court gave substantial weight

sobriety
to the

problem of drunk driving in this country and the carnage that has
resulted

from

the

alcohol

related

traffic

accidents.

The

roadblock in Sitz was established in accordance with guidelines
promulgated by a "Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee.1'

The

guidelines set procedures governing checkpoint operations, site
selection

and

publicity.

The

committee

was

comprised

of

representatives of state and local police, prosecutors and the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.
The roadblock at issue in this case was not limited to
one particular

state

interest

that was

problem, such as drunk driving.

a substantial

public

Sergeant Mangelson testified

that the purpose of the roadblock was to detect any criminal or
traffic violation.

The time and place of the roadblock were not

governed by any guidelines to limit the potential interference
with travelers.
public

that

There was virtually no notice to the traveling

they may be involved

in a roadblock.

The only

publicity of the roadblock was given in a Juab County newspaper.
The signs gave no notice that motorists were entering a law
enforcement

roadblock.

At

this

roadblock,

the officers had

unlimited discretion in the investigative actions they deemed to
be appropriate.
In Sitz the drunk driving problem was balanced against
the effectiveness of the roadblock procedure and the nature of
the Fourth Amendment intrusion.
objective

intrusion

roadblock.
emphasis

to

law

The Court focused on the minimal
abiding

citizens

caused

at

the

In doing so, the Court rejected the Michigan court's
on

motorists.

the

roadblock's

subjective

intrusion

caused

to

The Court then noted that the analysis of the degree

to which the seizure advances the public interest "was not meant
to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts
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the

decision

as

to

which

among

techniques should be employed
danger."

id. at 2483.
the DUI

reasonable

law

enforcement

to deal with a serious public

The court found that the checkpoint

resulted

in

arrests

of

1.5

percent

of

the drivers

stopped.

This was greater than the percentage of arrests made at

the permanent border checkpoint that was upheld in United States
v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
The nature of the stop and length of the intrusion for
the general motoring public involved in the roadblock at issue in
the

instant

case

was

significant.

However,

particular reason to establish that roadblock.
effectiveness

of

the

balancing equation.

cannot

be

was

no

Consequently, the
factored

into the

The only factor that carries any weight is

the Fourth Amendment
interests in this

intrusion

there

intrusion.

Therefore, in balancing the

case, the only conclusion that can be reached

is that the Fourth Amendment was violated.

When an intrusion is

not made to solve a particular and significant law enforcement
concern, the stop is indistinguishable from that conducted in
22
Brown v. Texas, supra.

Such a stop is also closely analogous

to the roving random vehicle stops for traffic violations which
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 684 (1979), prohibited.
The Court in Sitz did not allow roadblocks to be used
for
22

general

crime

detection.

The

Court

held

that

a very

In that case a statute that required individuals to provide
police officers with identification when stopped was found to
violate the Fourth Amendment.
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substantial

problem

of

drunk

intrusion of the roadblock.

driving

justified

the

minimal

In this case, the general need to

detect crime cannot be used to justify seizures that are not
based on any showing of individualized suspicion.
allowed,

the

Fourth

Amendment

would

be

If that were

meaningless.

The

roadblock in this case fails to pass the balancing test employed
in Sitz.
Amendment.

Consequently, the roadblock stop violated the Fourth
The evidence seized from petitioner's vehicle as a

result of that stop must be ordered suppressed.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE STOP
OF PETITIONER IS INADMISSIBLE UNLESS THE
STATE SHOWS THAT ANY CONSENT WAS NOT OBTAINED
THROUGH THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ILLEGAL STOP.
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d

684 (Utah 1990) r this

court reversed the Court of Appeals1 holding that a voluntary
consent in and of itself alleviates the taint of a prior illegal
stop or search.23
This court held that there must be a two part
analysis to determine the legal effect of a consent following an
unlawful

stop.

First,

there must

be

a voluntary

consent.

Second, the consent must not have been obtained through police
exploitation of the primary or antecedent police illegality.

To

be admissible, the State must show the evidence was obtained by
means sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal stop to be
purged of the primary taint.
23
See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989, revised 796
P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990).
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This court went on to note in Arroyo that the basis of
the second part of this analysis is found in the "fruit of the
poisonous

tree" doctrine

established

States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

in Wong

Sun

v. United

With respect to the manner in which

this doctrine related to consent searchesr the court stated, "The
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to
invalidate

consents

which,

despite

being

voluntary,

nonetheless the exploitation of a prior illegality."
690.

are

796 P.2d at

The court then cited with approval cases that reached that

same conclusion.
The legal authority for the lower court's decision in
Arroyo was the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carson, 793
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, den. 479 U.S. 914 (1986).

However,

this court found that the decision in Carson failed to provide
adequate

protections

"Police should

to

Fourth

Amendment

not be permitted

interests, stating,

to ratify their own

illegal

conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the illegality has
occurred."

Ld. at 689.

failed

effectuate

to

exclusionary rule.

It was then found that the Carson rule
either

of

the

two

purposes

of

the

First, police are not deterred for violating

the Fourth Amendment.

Second, the courts were made a party to

the prior illegal conduct of the police officers.

This court

found that the Carson rule simply ignored the police illegality.
To analyze the exploitation of the primary illegality
this court indicated that the test from Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975), should be followed.

In that case the Court held

that a confession was the fruit of a prior illegal arrest.
factors

that were

considered

by

the Court

in reaching

The
this

conclusion were the "temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances [and] the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct•"

422 U.S. at

603-604.
In applying the factors described in Brown v. Illinoisy
supra, to a consent search, a number of circumstances have been
discussed

in

the

case

law.

With

respect

to

the

temporal

proximity of the unlawful detention to the consent, the courts
have generally held that when the consent is closely related in
time

to the detention,

the

taint

of

the detention

remains.

United States v. Delquadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1988);

United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987);

United

States v. Thompson,

712 F.2d

1356

(11th Cir. 1983);

United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985);

C.f.

Juarez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Intervening circumstances have been found to include
release

from

discussions

custody,

with

charge, United
intervening
attenuation

a

an

lawyer, or

before

a conviction

the

magistrate,

on an unrelated

States v. Delqadillo-Velasquez, supra.

circumstances
between

that

may

establish

the unlawful detention

consent have been described
Miranda warning

appearance

and

in the case law:

and allowing the defendant

Other

sufficient

the voluntary
giving of the

to consult with a

passenger, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983),

Juarez v, State, supra, telling the defendant that he did not
have to consent to the search, Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414
(Tex.

Crim.

independent

App.

1987),

developing

probable

cause

sources to justify the detention United

from

State v.

Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986), and whether the consent was
volunteered or requested, People v. Borqes, 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 511
N.E.2d 58 (1987).
Circumstances relating to the purpose or flagrancy of
the violation have included:

the use of firearms to effect the

arrest, People v. Odom, 83 111. App. 3d 1022, 404 N.E.2d 997
(1980);

a manner of arrest or detention that causes confusion,

surprise

or

fright,

United

States

v.

Delquadillo-Velasquez,

supra: a complete lack of suspicion or information about criminal
activity by the defendant, United

States v. Thompson, supra.

State v. Zielman, 384 So.2d 359 (La. 1980); the circumstances of
the detention reflect that officers were on an expedition to find
evidence,

Reyes v. State, supra: or the use of threats or

physical force, United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284
(9th Cir. 1980).
In the instant case, the purported consent occurred
during

the

unlawful

detention.

There

were

no

intervening

circumstances between the detention and the consent.
the actions of the officers were purposeful
relation

to

the Fourth Amendment

violation.

stopped on Interstate 15 at a roadblock.

Finally,

and flagrant in
Petitioner was

(R. 153)

The lack of

legal authority to engage in such a procedure has previously been

discussed.

Likewise, troopers had unlimited discretion in how

the roadblock would be conducted.

After appellant was stopped,

Trooper Howard requested that petitioner produce his driver's
license and vehicle registration.

(R. 154)

The registration

indicated the vehicle belonged to petitioner's wife (R. 154) and
the driver's license was from Georgia.

(R. 154)

The trooper

confronted petitioner about these matters and also about the odor
of alcohol that petitioner had about him.

(R. 155)

The trooper

then asked petitioner if he was in possession of any alcohol,
firearms or drugs.

Petitioner then produced an open bottle of

liquor.

The trooper ordered petitioner out of the

(R. 155)

vehicle and requested his consent to search the vehicle.
156)

Petitioner acquiesced to that request.

(R.

(R. 156)

As can be seen, any consent given was inseparable from
the unlawful detention.

There was no substantial passage of time

to allow petitioner to reflect on whether or not he would grant
his consent to search.

There were no intervening circumstances

that would eliminate the taint of the continuing detention.
stated purpose of the roadblock was to discover
criminal violations.

The procedures

used

The

evidence of

in conducting

the

roadblock did nothing to dissipate fear or confusion on the part
of petitioner.

Finally, the questioning during the detention

took on an accusatory nature.

Petitioner and the passenger were

ordered out of the vehicle and petitioner merely acquiesced to
24
See:

Points II and III, supra.
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the

request

to

search

the

vehicle.

Any

consent

given by

petitioner was obtained as a result of the exploitation of the
initial unlawful detention.

The evidence seized is the fruit of

that initial detention and must be ordered suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule of Article If Section 14 of the
Constitution
States

of Utah and the Fourth Amendment

Constitution

should

apply

to

illegal

proceedings before the State Tax Commission.

to the United
drug

stamp

tax

The roadblock stop

of petitioner's vehicle violated both Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States

Constitution.

Any

consent

that

was

obtained

from

petitioner to allow his vehicle to be searched was gained through
the exploitation of this illegal roadblock.

The evidence seized

as a result of the stop and search of petitioner's vehicle should
not

have

been

introduced

in

the

illegal

proceedings before the state tax commission*
tax commission
without

should be reversed

drug

tax

stamp

The decision of the

and a new hearing

the use of the evidence seized from the

ordered

search of

petitioner's vehicle.
DATED this

day of December, 1990.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of December,

1990, I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to

John

McCarrey,

Assistant

Attorney

General,

Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.

at
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ADDENDUM

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

LOUIE E. SIMS,

)
Petitioner,

v.
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

)
:
)
:
)
:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal No.

88-2547

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on February 13, 1990.

Paul F. Iwasaki,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and in behalf of the
Commission.

Present

and representing the Petitioner was G.

Fred Metos, Attorney at Law.

Present

and

representing

the

Respondent was L. A. Dever, Assistant Attorney General.
Based upon the memoranda submitted and oral arguments
of the parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is the illegal drug stamp tax.

2,

The date in question is July 27, 1988.

Appeal No. 88-2547
3.

As a result of a search conducted of the motor

vehicle driven by the Petitioner, members of the Juab County
Sheriffs Office and Utah Highway Patrol seized

15 grams of

marijuana and 985 grams of cocaine.
4.

No drug stamps were affixed to

the

controlled

substances.
5.

A tax deficiency in the amount of $197,053 and a

penalty in an equal amount were assessed for the failure to
have

the

required

drug

stamps

affixed

to

the

controlled

substances.
6.

As a result of criminal charges arising out of

the possession of the controlled substances, the District Court
ruled that the search of the Petitioner's vehicle was lawful.
7.
required

to

Individuals who purchase the drug stamps are not
identify

themselves

by

name,

social

security

number, nor address when purchasing the stamps.
8.

No evidence was presented which would

indicate

that the information obtained from the individuals purchasing
the drug stamps is provided to law enforcement agencies.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A tax of $3.50 per gram of marijuana and a tax upon
cocaine at $200 per gram is imposed pursuant to the Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act.

(Utah Code Ann. §59-19-103.)

The evidence of tax paid is a stamp affixed to the
controlled substance.
Failure

to

(Utah Code Ann. §59-19-104.)
affix

the

stamp

shall

assessment of a tax plus a 100% civil penalty.
-2-

result

in

the

(Utah Code Ann.
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S59-19-106.)
The Tax Commission is not a judicial body established
under

the

empowered

Constitution
nor

authorized

constitutionality
State Tax

of

of

the

State

to

determine

legislative

of

Utah,
the

enactments.

nor

is

legality
(Shay

it
or

v. Utah

Commission,

120 P.2d

274

(Utah 1941);

State Tax

Commission v. Wright,

596 P.2d

634

(Utah

and

1979);

Belco

Petroleum Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d
204 (Wyoming 1978).
DECISION AND ORDER
The Petitioner has presented four issues to be decided
by the Commission:
1.

Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate the

Petitioner's right against self-incrimination?
2.

Does the Exclusionary Rule apply in proceedings

before the Tax Commission?
3.

Does

the

assessment

of

taxes

under

the

Act

violate the Petitioner's right to procedural due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution?
4.

Is the Act void because it is impermissibly vague

under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution?
Taking the above listed issues in reverse order, the
Tax Commission finds that with respect to issue numbers 3 and
4, the Tax Commission

is not a court
-3-

of

law

empowered

to

appeal No. 88-2547
determine the constitutionality of the statute-

Therefore, the

Tax Commission must assume the constitutional validity of the
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act,
With respect to the first issue, the Utah Court of
Appeals in the case of State of Utah v. Davis, (case number
89-0009-CA,

Court

of

Appeals, February

17,

1990)

addressed the issue of whether the Act violated
right against

self-incrimination.

directly

a person's

The Court of Appeals held

that it did not.
The Court found that by construing the Act to prohibit
the use of any information gained as a result of a purchaser's
compliance with the Act to establish a link in the chain of
evidence in a subsequent drug prosecution provides the same
protections provided by the Fifth Amendment, thus upholding the
Acts constitutionality.

In the present

case, there was

no

showing that any information obtained by the Tax Commission
regarding the purchase of the drug stamps was provided to law
enforcement agencies or became a link in the chain of evidence
in subsequent criminal proceedings.
The

remaining

issue,

the

applicability

of

the

Exclusionary Rule to proceedings before the Tax Commission, is
one of first impression.
In holding that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply
in proceedings before this body, the Tax Commission adopts the
balancing test set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court

in the

cases of United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) and INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

That test requires the

weighing of the benefits in deterring unlawful police conduct
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against the loss of probative evidence and the secondary costs
that flow from the less accurate adjudication that

therefore

occurrs.
The primary purpose of the Exclusionary Rule
deter

unlawful

application

of

police
the

conduct.

There

Exclusionary

is

Rule

in

proceedings would serve to meet that purpose.

no

is to

showing^that

Tax

Commission

Additionally, if

the Tax Commission were to apply the Exclusionary Rule in its
proceedings, inconsistent results could be found between those
hearings

and

criminal

proceedings

in

the

District

Court.

Therefore, the societal interest in deterring police conduct in
these

cases

does

not

outweigh

the

societal

interests

in

facilitating the accuracy of the fact finding process in these
hearings.
Based

upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission

finds

that the determination of the Collection Division's assessment
against the Petitioner for tax and penalties per the Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act is affirmed.
DATED this ^)Q

day of

It is so ordered.
<>yUrtJL_^

. 1990.

BY/dRpE»y5S JHE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

ABSENT
Z£>6 B. Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Cour
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b
63-46b-14(2)(a).
PFI/sld/9210w
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of-the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Louie E. Sims
c/o G. Fred Metos
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Richard Strong
Director, Collections
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Sam Vong
Operations, Central Files
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Lee Dever
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114
DATED this

pj\

day of

"^SJJAX
£VYM

Secretary
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, 1990.

